The conclusions of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s final report, published today, are damning. In his statement the Inquiry’s Chair stated that the deaths of the victims were all avoidable, and named numerous organisations who played a part in causing the tragedy either via their incompetence or, in a minority of cases, as a result of greed and dishonesty. 

Amongst its findings, the Inquiry made clear that the system of regulating the construction and refurbishment of high-rise residential buildings that existed at the time of the fire was seriously defective. That system has already undergone significant change since the fire, primarily as a result of The Building Safety Act 2022 (“the Act”) which brought in various measures aimed at ensuring the safety of residential buildings. However, the Inquiry has concluded that more can and should be done to bring a change of attitude to the construction industry.  

The Inquiry has made various recommendations across a variety of issues which, if adopted, will have a significant impact on the construction industry. These are recommendations only at this stage but are likely to be acted upon by the government, given the severity of the issues and the past failures to act on advice.

We summarise the key recommendations below:

A review of the definition of “higher-risk building”

Of particular note is the Inquiry’s recommendation that the government urgently reviews what is considered to be a higher-risk building. 

The concept of a “higher-risk building” was introduced by the Act. Those buildings which meet the definition are subject to the onerous regulations contained in the Act, which govern the design, construction and occupation of those buildings. It is of paramount importance for a developer, and those working for it, to know whether or not its building will be a higher-risk building. 

Under the current rules a higher-risk building is (in broad terms) a building that is at least 18 metres in height (or has at least seven storeys) and contains at least two residential units. The Inquiry considers the current test by refence to height to be arbitrary, and flagged that it does not take into account other important factors such as the building’s use or the presence of vulnerable individuals. 

A review of this definition could have a significant impact on which buildings are subject to the enhanced regulatory regime under the Act, and significant consequences for the viability of developments which were previously understood to be outside of that regime. 

A review of building regulation guidance

The Inquiry found that building regulations are satisfactory, but considers that the statutory guidance to those regulations, particularly the guidance contained in “Approved Document B”, is unsatisfactory. This has been the source of many problems, as it has been the tendency of many in the industry to treat Approved Document B as a definitive statement of what the regulations require. 

It is recommended that:

  • the statutory guidance is reviewed and a revised version of Approved Document B is published as soon as possible; 
  • the revised guidance should contain a clear warning that compliance with the guidance may not result in compliance with the regulations; 
  • any assumption that there is effective compartmentation within a building, which would make a “stay-put” fire response strategy appropriate,  should be reconsidered;
  • the revised guidance should draw attention to the need for a qualified fire engineer to calculate the likely rate of fire spread and the time required for evacuation, including those with physical or mental impairments, as an essential part of the fire safety strategy; and
  • fresh minds, including experienced and skilled representatives of the academic community as well as those with practical experience of the industry (including fire engineers), should advise on the revisions to the guidance.

Changes to the “gateways” building control regime

The Inquiry makes a number of recommendations which would have an impact on the “gateways” building control regime for higher-risk buildings introduced by the Act.

It is recommended that the following additional documents are submitted with the building control application (Gateway 2):

  • a fire safety strategy for the building produced by a registered fire engineer, which takes account of vulnerable people;
  • a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the building regulations; and
  • a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the building regulations.

It is also recommended that the fire safety strategy submitted at Gateway 2 should be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion (Gateway 3).

Regulation of professionals within the construction industry

The Inquiry makes the following recommendations as to how professionals working within the construction industry should be regulated. 

  • A licensing scheme operated by the construction regulator should be introduced for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings;
  • The Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects should review the steps they have taken since the Grenfell Tower fire to improve the education and training of architects, to check that they are in line with the Inquiry’s findings;
  • The profession of fire engineers should be recognised and protected by law and that an independent body be established to regulate the profession. A group of practitioners and academics should be convened to define the knowledge and skills to be expected of a competent fire engineer. An understanding of the principles of fire engineering should be encouraged in construction professionals and members of the fire and rescue services; and
  • The government should establish a system of mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of fire risk assessors by setting standards for qualification and continuing professional development and such other measures as may be considered necessary or desirable.

Changes to those exercising Building Control functions

The Inquiry found that, at the time of the fire, many of those involved in major construction projects regarded building control primarily as a source of advice and assistance. It also found that approved inspectors had a commercial interest in acquiring and retaining customers that conflicted with the performance of their role as guardians of the public interest.  

In light of these findings, the Inquiry recommends that the government appoints an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process, or whether building control functions should be performed by a national authority.

Fire safety responsibility within government

The Inquiry was critical of the fragmented approach to fire safety issues within both government and the construction industry. It recommends that the following appointments be made, with a view to consolidating the various responsibilities, driving change and enabling effective information sharing between those responsible for different aspects of the industry.

  • A single Secretary of State with responsibility for fire safety functions.
  • A Chief Construction Adviser, with good working knowledge and practical experience of the construction industry,  to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry. 
  • A new Construction Regulator overseeing a single independent body, reporting to the Secretary of State, who should exercise all of the following functions:
  1. the regulation of construction products;
  2. the development of suitable methods for testing the reaction to fire of materials and products intended for use in construction;
  3. the testing and certification of such products;
  4. the issue of certificates of compliance of construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards;
  5. the regulation and oversight of building control;
  6. the licensing of contractors to work on higher-risk buildings;
  7. monitoring the operation of the Building Regulations and the statutory guidance and advising the Secretary of State on the need for change;
  8. carrying out research on matters affecting fire safety in the built environment;
  9. collecting information, both in this country and abroad, on matters affecting fire safety;
  10. exchanging information with the fire and rescue services on matters affecting fire safety;
  11. accrediting fire risk assessors; and
  12. maintaining a publicly available library of test data and publications.

The Inquiry also recommends that the government should have a legal requirement to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations on fire safety issues made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries together with a description of the steps taken in response. 

Testing and certification of products

The Inquiry makes various recommendations regarding the testing and certification of products.

The small-scale test methods which have previously been used to assess the fire performance of an external wall were found to be unreliable. The Inquiry therefore recommends that steps be taken in conjunction with the professional and academic community to develop new test methods to reliably assess the fire performance of external walls. In the meantime, the government should make clear that BS 9414 should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.

As set out above, it is recommended that the construction regulator should be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products. As part of this process:

  • certificates of conformity should include all test results;
  • manufacturers should be required to provide the construction regulator with the full testing history of the product or material to which the certificate relates and inform the regulator of any material circumstances that may affect its performance; and
  • manufacturers should be required by law to provide on request copies of all test results that support claims about fire performance made for their products.